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1
Is the private (individual) return to human capital low in Italy compared to other
countries? And what about the social return? Do education, tax, and welfare policies in place
amount to a tax or a subsidy on schooling in Italy? And does the pattern of taxes and
subsidies move human capital investment towards the socially desirable level? How should
public funds be allocated between infrastructure and human capital investment? Answering
these questions requires estimates of the private and social return to schooling in Italy. It is
this task of measurement and estimation that lies at the center of our paper.
The private return to schooling is the discount rate that equalizes the present value of
the private costs and benefits generated by an increase in the schooling of a representative
individual. The private cost of schooling includes directs costs as well as the opportunity
cost of schooling; the private benefit includes increased after-tax wages as well as reduced
unemployment spells to the extent that such spells are associated with income losses. Our
estimation yields a private return to a one-year increase in schooling in Italy of 8.9%, which
is considerably larger than the effect of a one-year increase in schooling on after-tax wages
(around 6%). The discrepancy is mainly explained by schooling reducing the probability of
unemployment.
Across Italian macro regions, the private return to a one-year increase in schooling
ranges from 8.4 to 9%. Interestingly, the private return to schooling in the South is larger
than the private return in the North, although differences are not statistically significant. This
is in spite of the effect of schooling on after-tax wages being significantly lower in the South
than the North. These apparently contradictory results are reconciled by our finding that the
effect of schooling on employment is significantly larger in the South than the North. We
also estimate the private return to upper secondary and university education. For Italy as a
whole, we find an annual return to upper secondary schooling of 9.7% and an annual return
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to a university education of 10.3%. Private returns are even higher in the South, where the
annual values are 10.2% and 12.3% respectively. All our estimates indicate that the return to
schooling in Italy, particularly in the South, compares very favorably to the historical return
of the average portfolio of stocks and government bonds.
We also estimate the social return to schooling in Italy and the four macro regions and
compare it to the social return to infrastructure. The social return to schooling
(infrastructure) is defined as the discount rate that equalizes the present value of social costs
and benefits of increased schooling (infrastructure). The key difference with the calculation
of the private return to schooling is that the social return depends on the effect of schooling
on output (taking into account possible aggregate decreasing returns to schooling), not
wages, and that the social return ignores redistribution.  Our comparisons between the social
return to schooling and that to infrastructure investment indicates that the return to schooling
clearly exceeds that to infrastructures in the South. These results should be taken with care
however because of the limitations of the existing regional estimates of infrastructure capital
(Montanaro, 2002).
Finally, we propose a way to analyze the consequences of increased schooling for
public finances under alternative scenarios regarding the (implicit) tuition subsidy, the
progressivity of the income tax, and features of the unemployment insurance system.
The paper follows the methodology introduced by de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002),
developed further by de la Fuente (2003), and extended to the regional level by de la Fuente,
Doménech, and Jimeno (2003) and Ciccone (2004). The key difference with Ciccone (2004)
is that our calculations are at the macro-region level instead of the administrative-region
level, which increases the size of samples and therefore reduces parameter uncertainty, and
that we account for the endogeneity of individual schooling when estimating key parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents estimates of the
effects of schooling on individual wages, employment probabilities, and participation rates
as well as on aggregate productivity. Sections 3 to 5 contain the core of our analysis. Section
3 constructs measures of the private return to schooling. Section 4 deals with the effects of
educational investment on public budgets. And Section 5 estimates the social return to
schooling. Section 6 summarizes. The Appendix contains data details and additional results.9
2   Econometric estimates of the effects of schooling
In this section we estimate the effects of individual schooling on individual wages and
labor market outcomes and the effect of average schooling on aggregate productivity at the
regional level.
2.1   The effect of schooling on wages (the Mincerian return to schooling)
Our estimates of the effect of schooling on wages, which we will refer to as Mincerian
returns to schooling, are based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) for every second year between 1987 and 1995 plus 1998 and 2000 (for a full
description of the data available in SHIW see Brandolini et al. 2002) . Combined, these
surveys provide data on earnings, working hours, and personal characteristics (including the
administrative region of residence) of over 45 000 individuals.
2 When estimating the effect
of schooling on wages at the regional level we face a trade off between the number of
regions considered and the number of individuals in each region. The regional classification
that we end up using is that of four so-called macro-regions as defined by the National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT): Northwest (Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Valle d’Aosta),
Northeast (Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia-Romagna), Center
(Lazio, Toscana, Umbria, Marche), and South (Abruzzo, Puglia, Basilicata, Molise,
Campania, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna). We will also present separate results for all
Objective 1 regions combined (Calabria, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Sardegna and
Sicilia).
3
The SHIW data is used to estimate the following standard Mincerian wage equation
(1) ln  wi = c + θSi + a*expi + b*expi2 + d*Dgenderi +Dyeari+ ui
where  w is the net hourly wage (there is no information on gross earnings in the
SHIW; the earnings data is net of withheld income tax and employee social security
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contributions) and schooling is measured by the number of years of formal schooling (S)
while experience is captured by potential experience (exp which is calculated as age minus
six minus years of formal education).
4 The regression also includes dummies for gender
(Dgender) and the year the worker is observed (Dyear).  In addition to (1), we also estimate
a specification that replaces years of schooling by dummy variables for secondary school
attainment and university attainment.
Table 1 contains the least-squares estimates of the Mincerian returns to schooling
across macro-regions (these Mincerian returns are very precisely estimated; standard errors
are never larger than 0.1%). The column entitled “years of schooling” contains the
percentage increase in wages associated with one additional year of schooling. The columns
entitled “upper secondary” and “university” contain the average annual return to secondary
schooling and the average annual return to university respectively.
Table 1





North West 6.56 5.87 6.76
North East 6.23 5.28 6.97
Center 5.86 5.33 7.33
South 5.80 6.15 8.31
Objective 1 5.78 6.17 8.12
Italy 6.09 5.66 7.40
Italy: male 5.82 5.36 7.37
Italy: female 6.42 6.14 7.38
                                                          
4 SHIW does not report the number of years of schooling attended but only the highest degree completed.
We  coded this information into years of schooling attributing 5 years to primary degrees, 8 years to junior high
school, 13 year to secondary school and 18 years to college graduates and post-graduate. Also, in the
regressions we only used data regarding individuals aged 15 to 64.11
It can be seen that the Mincerian return to schooling is lower in the South. Moreover,
the difference between the North and the South is statistically significant at the 1-percent
level. Interestingly, the regional ordering of Mincerian returns to schooling is rather different
when we focus on upper secondary and university education, where Mincerian returns turn
out to be greater in the South than the North.
Mincerian returns to schooling are usually estimates using data on gross wages, and it
therefore makes sense to make an attempt to understand what our estimates could imply in
gross terms. We therefore take the following approach. Brandolini and Cipollone (2002)
estimate the Mincerian return to education using both net and gross wages and find that the
gross return exceeds the net return. As their findings indicate that the gross return is at least
13% higher than the net return, we apply a conservative 13% upwards adjustment factor to
our after-tax Mincerian returns in Table 1 (Brunello, Comi, and Lucifora (2000) suggest an
adjustment factor of similar magnitude). These before-tax Mincerian returns are reported in
Table 2.
Table 2









Individual levels of schooling are endogenous, which raises the concern that Mincerian
returns to schooling obtained using least-squares methods are biased. The direction of the12
bias is uncertain, however. In particular, if unobserved factors as innate ability are positively
correlated to school attainment then least square estimates would attribute to schooling part
of the wage premium due to ability overestimating the true return to education. On the other
hand, if schooling and ability are substitutes then Mincerian returns to schooling obtained
using least-squares methods would be biased downwards; error in measurement of individual
schooling would also lead to attenuation bias. The appropriate way of dealing with these
issues is an instrumental-variables methodology. There is a very large literature on this issue
and one of the main conclusions of this literature seems to be that the least-squares bias is
small in practice (see Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1999 and 2001). We will
nevertheless try an instrumental-variables methodology for the case of Italian macro regions.
The 1993-2000 waves of the SHIW contain information on parents’ schooling. We
will therefore instrument schooling of each individual in the SHIW with schooling of his or
her parents (see Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) for a similar approach and Card (1999)
for the set of conditions under which such identification strategy provides consistent
estimation of the Mincerian returns to schooling). The results of estimating equation (1)
using two-stage least squares (TSLS) are given in Table 3. Table 3 also contains least-
squares (LS) estimates.
It can be seen that least-squares estimates are somewhat higher when using the 1993-
2000 waves of the SHIW than when using the 1987-2000 waves (as in Table 1). Differences
in the return to schooling between the North and the South are however rather similar in the
two cases. Moreover, the two-stage least-squares estimates in Table 3 are larger than the
least-squares estimates (a pattern often found in the literature). Interestingly from our point
of view, the difference between the North and South is similar for those found using least
squares (and continues to be statistically significant at the 1-percent level). Our preferred
instrumental-variable estimates of the Mincerian return to schooling are obtained by first
calculating an instrumental-variables adjustment factor, the ratio between the two-stage
least-squares and the least-squares estimate in Table 3, for each region and the applying this
factor to the estimates in Table 1.13
Table 3
 LS AND TSLS ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF SCHOOLING ON NET WAGE
(1993-2000 SHIW WAVES)
Years of schooling Years of schooling
LS TSLS
North West 6.9 7.6
North East 6.7 7.5
Center 6.3 7.1
South 6.2 6.9
Objective 1 6.2 6.9
Italy 6.5 7.2
2.2   The effect of schooling on labor force participation and employment
We follow Heckman’s (1979) well-known two-step approach to estimate the effect of
schooling on labor force participation rates and employment probabilities. The approach
consists of first estimating a probit model linking the probability of labor market
participation to the individual’s schooling as well as other characteristics (listed in Table 4).
The second step tries to explain the probability of employment (p) by the individual’s
schooling, a subset of the explanatory variables used in the participation equation (also listed
in Table 4), and an estimate of the individual’s propensity to participate in the labor market
(the so-called inverse Mill's ratio), obtained from the first step. The Mill's ratio is meant to
correct for the bias that would arise if one failed to take into account that labor market
participation is endogenous. The data used comes from the 2000 and 2001 labor force
surveys and the number of observations used is just above 70 000.14
Table 4
 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN THE PARTICIPATION AND
EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS (OTHER THAN SCHOOLING)
participation employment
gender (male) X X
potential experience X X
potential experience squared X X
university student X X
non-university student X X
yearly dummies (1996-2000) X X
quarterly dummies (Q1-Q3) X X
Married X
married*male X
Tables 5 and 6 report our findings for the two steps (participation and employment
probabilities). In particular, we report estimated marginal effects (in %) evaluated at the
sample mean. Estimates in the first column of Tables 5 and 6 (entitled “years of schooling”)
come from the Mincerian specification using years of schooling as the variable capturing
formal education. The other two coefficients are constructed using the estimated coefficients
of the educational dummies included in the second specification. As in the previous section,
they should be interpreted as marginal effects per year of schooling at each level.
In the “Italy” row of Table 5, it can be seen that participation effects are larger for
university than secondary school attainment. The participation effect of one additional year
of schooling lies between the university and secondary school values. More importantly
from our point of view, participation effects are larger in the South than the North whatever
the schooling variable used (and these differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent
level).15
Table 5







North West 1.40 2.18 2.14
North East 1.39 2.15 1.00
Center 2.03 2.67 2.23
South 3.21 3.65 3.48
Objective 1 3.24 3.67 3.53
Italy 2.37 2.12 2.49
Italy: male 1.21 2.10 2.28
Italy: female 3.22 4.31 1.35
1Based on Labor Force Survey 2000 and 2001
Table 6








North West 0.76 0.98 0.51
North East 0.30 0.55 0.00
Center 1.05 1.22 0.89
South 3.02 2.68 3.20
Objective 1 3.10 2.70 3.42
Italy 1.59 1.87 1.40
Italy: male 1.55 1.32 1.13
Italy: female 1.77 1.79 1.40
1Based on Labor Force Survey 2000 and 2001
Note: The zero coefficient in bold has been imposed. Point estimates in
these cases were negative but not statistically different from zero.16
As can be seen from the “Italy” row in Table 6, employment effects follow the same
pattern as participation effects at the national level. Moreover, employment effects are larger
in the South than the North whatever the schooling variable used (and these differences are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level).
Endogeneity of schooling is at least as much of a concern in the participation and
employment equations as in the wage equations. We will therefore instrument schooling of
each individual with schooling of his or her parents. In order to do so we have to estimate the
participation and employment equations using the 1993-2000 SHIW data, as there is not data
on parents’ schooling in the labor force survey.
Table 7 presents our results for the participation equation. The first column of results
indicates that changing the sample but not the estimation method lowers the average effect in
Italy (2.09) compared to Table 5 (2.37). Moreover, the South and North are considerably
closer in Table 7 than in Table 5. The second column of results shows that the effect of
schooling on participation is lower and differences across regions smaller when we use
instrumental-variables methods.
Table 7






North West 1.61 1.3
North East 1.38 0.3
Center 1.8 0.8
South 2.4 0.8
Objective 1 2.6 1.0
Italy 2.09 1.117
Table 8 repeats the exercise for the employment equation (conditional on
participation). The first column of results indicates that changing the sample but not the
estimation method does not change the average effect in Italy (1.51) much compared to
Table 6 (1.59). Moreover, the difference between the South and North is similar in the two
cases. According to the second column of results, the effect of schooling on employment
increases when we use instrumental-variables methods. The difference between the North
and the South also increases somewhat.
Table 8
 EFFECT OF SCHOOLING ON EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONAL ON






North West 0.23 0.42
North East 0.33 0.06
Center 0.22 1.45
South 2.4 2.93
Objective 1 2.5 2.70
Italy 1.51 2.13
2.3   The effects of average schooling on regional productivity5
We now turn to the effects of average schooling on regional productivity using a
regional production-function framework (in logs)
(2)  qit = ait + αk*kit + αx*xit  + β*seit
                                                          
5 This section is based on Ciccone (2004).18
where qit  is the log of output per worker in region i at time t, k and x the logs of non-
infrastructure physical capital and infrastructures per worker,  se  the log of the average
number of years of schooling of the working age population and a  the log of total factor
productivity. Equation (2) is estimated using yearly data for all administrative regions over
the period 1970-94.
The data on regional employment, output, and the stock of non-infrastructure physical
capital and infrastructure capital are taken from the CRENOS research center at the
University of Cagliari. GDP and physical capital are measured in 1985 prices. The data on
schooling at the regional level have been derived using the 1971-81-91 issues of the
population census. Infrastructure capital includes publicly financed transportation networks
(roads and highways, ports, airports and railways), water works, sewage and urban
structures. Non-infrastructure physical capital includes private capital and the stock of public
capital associated with the provision of education, health and general administrative services.
These items are aggregated because our output measure includes government-provided
services. We also include common time effects and region-specific time-invariant effects in
the regression.
Table 9 contains the results of estimating equation (2) using least squares. The
estimated elasticity of output with respect to average schooling is statistically significant and
between 0.411 and 0.501. Non-infrastructure physical capital enters equation (2) with a
positive and significant coefficient (between 0.247 and 0.288) that is similar to the share of
physical capital in income. Infrastructure capital is insignificant (even when we consider
growth over 5-year periods in order to allow for productivity improvements due to better
infrastructure to set in with lags).
Estimating equation (2) replacing CRENOS infrastructure capital series with those
developed by Bonaglia and Picci (2000) leaves the estimate of β basically unchanged. But
infrastructure capital is now significant while non-infrastructure physical capital becomes
insignificant. In particular, the coefficient on infrastructure capital becomes 0.17 and is
significant at the 5-percent level, while the coefficient on non-infrastructure capital halves
and becomes insignificant at the 5-percent level.19
Table 9
GROWTH ESTIMATES WITH ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLING SERIES AND
SPECIFICATIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αk
0.256 0.247 0.288 0.287
(4.66) (4.76) (5.30) (5.48)
αx
0.0026 0.0023 -0.002 -0.002
(0.34) (0.87) (-0.48) (-0.79)
β
0.500 0.477 0.411 0.501
















255 255 255 255
Note: t ratios in parentheses below each coefficient.
We further explored the robustness of our estimate of β using industrial (as opposed to
total) productivity growth as right-hand side variable in equation (2). This allows us to
choose between two alternative non-infrastructure physical capital series: the industrial non-
infrastructure physical capital series of Bonaglia and Picci (2000) and the series of
CRENOS. Using CRENOS series for both non-infrastructure and infrastructure capital
yields a higher effect of average educational attainment on productivity than in Table 6. This
remains the case when the two series are replaced with those estimated by Bonaglia and
Picci (2000). All in all we conclude that the results shown in Table 9 provide reliable
quantification of the effects of schooling on regional productivity.20
3   Private returns to schooling
We now calculate the “proper” private return to the financial resources invested in
schooling for Italy as a whole and the four macro regions. This return takes into account the
private cost of schooling (including the opportunity cost) and the effect of schooling on
wages as well as employment probabilities (and hence on unemployment). In particular, the
private rate of return to schooling is calculated as the discount rate that equates the present
value of the additional costs of schooling to the present value of the stream of net-of-tax
earnings generated by an increase in schooling. The methodology we use is developed in de
la Fuente and Ciccone (2002) and de la Fuente (2003). Before presenting our results, we
briefly summarize the procedures used.
3.1   Methodology
Rates of return are calculated under the assumption that the individual participates in
the labor market until retirement and that unemployment spells are due to difficulties in
finding a job. This implies that rates of return are conditional on labor force participation.
Moreover, our calculations assume that individuals can work 20% of a standard work-year
while enrolled in school, although, again, they may not succeed in finding a job. The rate of
return estimates also account for labor income taxation and social security contributions as
well as unemployment benefits. All tax and benefit parameters will refer to a single
individual without children and assume that unemployment spells are sufficiently short to
not exhaust contributive benefits.
As already mentioned, the private rate of return to schooling (rp) is calculated as the
discount rate that equates the present value of the additional costs of schooling to the present
value of the stream of net-of-tax earnings generated by an increase in schooling. De la
Fuente (2003) shows that rp is given by
(3)   rp = Rp + g
where g is the exogenous growth rate of productivity while Rp is implicitly defined by21
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where θ measures the marginal effect of education to gross wages, po the likelihood of
employment of an adult with the relevant attainment level, ε = p'/po the employment effects
of schooling, Ф the fraction of time taken up by full-time school attendance, µs the direct
costs of schooling relative to full-time wages and H the number of years the individual is in
the labor force. The additional parameters capture taxes and benefits:  τo and T' are the
average and marginal tax paid by the representative full-time worker, τs the average tax on
income from part-time work and a and b the net replacement ratio for unemployed workers
linked and not linked to previous earnings. All definitions and data sources are summarized
in Table 10.
The interpretation of (4) is explained in detail in de la Fuente (2003). Summarizing, the
right-hand side represents the marginal benefits derived from an increase in schooling
relative to its cost. The first term in the numerator is equal to the increase in after-tax
earnings for a given probability of employment. The second term in the numerator is the
increase in net earnings that works through changes in the probability of employment. The
denominator captures the total cost of the increase in schooling, which is the sum of the
opportunity cost and the direct costs of schooling born by the individual. Note that
educational subsidies or the direct public provision of education raises the return to
schooling by lowering its cost to the individual. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand,
reduce the return to schooling by lowering the loss of earnings associated with
unemployment.
Table 11 shows the actual data used in the rate of return calculations.22
Table 10
VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE
PRIVATE RATE OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING AND SOURCES OF THE DATA
parameters
γ = 1.5, rate of exogenous productivity growth. Source: Jones (2002).
φ = 0.8, fraction of time taken up by (full-time) school attendance; 1-φ is the potential labor
supply while in school. Source: de la Fuente (2003).
U  =  59.4 = Average retirement age in 1995 in Italy, constructed by averaging separate
estimates for men and women, weighted in proportion to their shares in total
employment. Source: de la Fuente (2003).
variables
So = average years of school attainment of the adult population (between 25 and 65 years
old) in 2001. Source: LFS (2001)
H = U - Max(6+So, 15) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of the
representative individual.
θ = microeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. It measures the average (log)
increase in gross wages (wages before income taxes and employee social security
contributions are withheld) resulting from an additional year of schooling. Source: Section
2.1.
µs = direct cost of schooling born by the individual, measured as a fraction of average gross
earnings of full-time salaried workers (weighted average of secondary and tertiary levels
with weights 2/3 and 1/3 respectively). Average costs are shown net of direct public
subsidies to students for living costs and other non-tuition expenses and will be negative
when these subsidies exceed tuition charges. Source: Appendix A1.
µ = total (private + public) cost of schooling per student measured as a fraction of average
gross earnings of full-time salaried workers (weighted average of secondary and tertiary
levels with weights 2/3 and 1/3 respectively). It excludes an estimate of research
expenditures by universities. Source: Section 2.1 and Appendix A1.
po , ps; the former is the probability of employment after leaving school, conditional on
participation in the labor force. Following de la Fuente, Doménech, and Jimeno (2003),
this is the predicted value of the second-stage employment equation evaluated at the
average value of the explanatory variables. The employment probability of students is
approximated by adding to this average prediction a weighted average of the coefficients
of the dummies for non-university and university students (with weights 2/3 and 1/3)
respectively. Estimated using the results in section 2.2.
ps =  probability of employment while attending school, conditional on participation in the
labor force. Estimated using the results in section 2.2.23
η  = ps/po, correction factor capturing the greater difficulty of finding part-time employment
while attending school.
ε = p'(S)/p(S) measures the responsiveness of the probability of employment of active
workers to a marginal increase in their level of schooling. Estimated using the results in
section 2.2.
το = average tax rate on labor income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to the single worker with no children with
average full-time earnings in 2002. Source: Agenzia delle Entrate
(www.agenziaentrate.gov.it) and Appendix A1.
T' = marginal tax rate on labor income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to a single worker with no children with
average full-time earnings in 2002. Source: Agenzia delle Entrate and Appendix A1.
 τs = average tax rate on labor income (including national and regional income taxes and
employee social security contributions) applicable to the single worker with no children
earning 20% of average full-time earnings in 2002 (i.e. tax rate on average student income).
Source: Agenzia delle Entrate and Appendix A1.
a = first component of the net replacement ratio (ratio of net after-tax earnings out of work to
net after-tax earnings while employed) for a single individual with no children whose
previous earnings were equal to the average production worker's salary. This parameter
captures the effects of unemployment benefits that are linked to previous earnings (it is
assumed that unemployment spells are sufficiently brief so that contributory benefits are not
exhausted). Source: de la Fuente (2003).
6
b = second component of the net replacement ratio, calculated under the same assumptions as
a. It captures the effects of unemployment and housing benefits whose amount is not linked
to previous earnings. Source: de la Fuente (2003).
                                                          
6 The parameters de la Fuente (2003) uses for Italy are based on the OECD publication Benefit Systems and
Work Incentives 1999.24
Table 11
 DATA USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE PRIVATE RATE OF RETURN TO
SCHOOLING
SHθ µs µ po ps
North West 59.4 45.3 7.44% 3.26% 23.93% 96.08% 61.28%
North East 59.4 45.3 7.07% 2.13% 21.86% 96.78% 77.60%
Center 59.4 45.3 6.65% 1.82% 19.85% 93.85% 64.84%
South 59.4 45.3 6.58% 2.28% 20.33% 80.88% 31.64%
Objective 1 59.4 45.3 6.56% 1.83% 20.01% 79.63% 27.79%
Italy 59.4 45.3 6.91% 2.20% 20.79% 91.55% 56.15%
η  ε το T' τs ab
North West 63.78% 0.79% 30.41% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%
North East 80.18% 0.31% 30.79% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%
Center 69.09% 1.12% 30.44% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%
South 39.12% 3.74% 30.34% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%
Objective 1 34.90% 3.90% 30.37% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%
Italy 61.33% 1.73% 30.83% 42.69% 9.19% 39.28% 2.29%25
3.2   Average (across attainment levels) private return to schooling
Table 12 contains our results for the average (across all attainment levels) private
return to one additional year of schooling for Italy and all macro regions. The private return
for Italy as a whole is 8.9% and the return varies between 8.4 and 9% across macro regions.
The private return to schooling in Objective 1 regions is 9.1% and therefore above the
average for the entire country.
Table 12


















Note: The standard errors in parenthesis have been obtained based on a bootstrap procedure
with 1000 replications.26
The private rate of return to schooling at the macro region level should be seen as an
approximation to the rate of return of individuals who acquire their schooling and work in
the macro region. It is an approximation only because, while the effect of schooling on
wages and employment are estimated using residents in the macro region, these residents
may not have obtained their schooling in the region (our data does not contain this
information). This could bias the results in Table 12 if, as seems likely, the quality of
schooling in the North is higher than in the South.
7 As long as the share of workers educated
in the North is higher in the North than in the South, this bias would lead us to understate the
gap in returns to schooling between South and North if both had the same quality of
schooling. Or, to put it differently, it is extremely unlikely that our finding that private
returns to schooling in the South are greater than in the North is explained by our data not
allowing us to account for differences in educational quality.
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the private rates of return to schooling as well as the
so-called raw returns across regions. The raw returns are obtained by setting all tax and
benefit parameters in (4) equal to zero. Comparing the private returns and the raw returns to
schooling therefore allows for a simple assessment of how policies affect the return to
schooling. It can be seen that the raw returns exceed the private returns in each region. The
average gap is approximately 3%. Thus the pattern of taxes and subsidies in Italy tends to
lower the private return to schooling. The reason is that, while the (mostly) public provision
of schooling in Italy raises the private return to schooling, the progressivity of the income tax
reduces it. This result becomes clearest when we calculate the private return to schooling
assuming that individuals bear the full social cost of schooling but that income taxation is
proportional instead of progressive. This calculation yields a private return to schooling of
10%, more than a percentage point higher than the actual private return to schooling (8.9%).
                                                          
7 For example, according to the year 2000 results of the OECD "Program for International Student
Assessment" (PISA), students in the North performed better than students in the South in all the assessment
domains considered by the program (reading literacy, mathematical literacy and scientific literacy).27
Figure 1
 PRIVATE AND RAW RATES OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING
3.3   Instrumental variables estimates of average return to schooling
Table 13 shows the parameters used in the instrumental-variables calculations of the
rate of return. They are obtained by adjusting the parameters in Table 11 using the
instrumental-variables estimates of the effect of schooling on wages and employment
conditional on participation. In particular, we follow two adjustment procedures.
“Adjustment 1” is obtained by adjusting the least-squares parameter estimates in each macro
area obtained using the largest possible sample according to the discrepancy between least-
squares and instrumental-variables estimates in (the same) smaller samples in each macro
area. “Adjustment 2” follows the same approach but applies the same (national) adjustment
factor to all regions (because the discrepancy between least-squares and instrumental-
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Table 13
DATA USED IN THE IV CALCULATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RATE OF
RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
Adjustment 1
θ Po Ps η  ε
North West 8.3% 96.1% 61.2% 63.7% 1.0%
North East 8.0% 96.8% 77.9% 80.4% 0.0%
Center 7.5% 94.0% 69.2% 73.6% 2.4%
South 7.4% 81.0% 30.4% 37.5% 4.4%
Objective 1 7.4% 80.0% 26.8% 33.5% 4.1%
Italy 7.8% 91.6% 54.8% 59.7% 2.4%
Adjustment 2
θ po Ps η  ε
North West 8.3% 96.2% 59.6% 61.9% 1.4%
North East 7.9% 96.9% 75.9% 78.3% 0.9%
Center 7.5% 93.9% 63.1% 67.2% 1.8%
South 7.5% 81.0% 29.9% 37.0% 4.5%
Objective 1 7.4% 79.7% 26.1% 32.7% 4.7%
Italy 7.8% 91.7% 54.5% 59.4% 2.4%29
Table 14 summarizes the private return to one additional year of schooling for all
regions and the entire country using an instrumental-variables approach. It can be seen that
the average for the entire country is greater than in Table 12 whatever the instrumental-
variables adjustment used. The difference between the North and the South is however
similar in all cases (around 1 percent).
Table 14





North West 9.7% 10.0%
North East 9.3% 9.9%
Center 10.3% 9.6%
South 10.2% 10.3%
Objective 1 10.0% 10.3%
Italy 10.2% 10.2%
3.4  Results by educational level
We now turn to the estimation of rates of return for upper secondary education and
university education.
3.4.1   Metodology and data
The definitions of the variables entering the rate of return formula given in Table 10 in
the previous section continue to be valid with the following minor changes. First, when
calculating the marginal returns to upper secondary attainment it will be assumed that the
opportunity cost of a student enrolled is determined by the average wage and employment30
probability of full-time workers who have completed lower secondary schooling and by the
corresponding tax and benefit parameters. This implies that calculation of the rates of return
requires estimating the average wage and employment probability of a representative
individual for each attainment level and region.  Second, calculation of the rates of return
now requires level-specific estimates of the (annual) marginal wage and employment effects
obtained. Third, the private and total direct costs of schooling are allowed to be different for
upper secondary and university education. Finally, the length of post-school working lives
will now be higher for the representative worker with only upper secondary education
attainment than for the worker with university attainment.
3.4.2   Results
Table 15 shows the private return to upper secondary and university attainment for all
regions and the entire country. It can be seen that both the return to university and the return
to upper secondary school for the whole of Italy are higher than in the previous exercise.
Table 15





North West 9.2% 8.3%
North East 8.8% 9.0%
Center 8.7% 9.8%
South 10.2% 12.3%
Objective 1 10.2% 12.4%
Italy 9.7% 10.3%
Figure 231
 PRIVATE RATE OF RETURN TO UPPER SECONDARY AND UNIVERSITY
ATTAINMENT
3.5   The private return to schooling compared with that on alternative assets
According to Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002), the real before-tax average annual
return to equity in Italy over the 1950-2000 period was 5.2%. The real before-tax average
annual return to bonds over the same period was 1.9% and to the average portfolio 3.6%.
Hence, schooling appears as a very attractive investment from an individual point of view.
For example, the return to upper secondary schooling exceeds the return to holding the
average portfolio by 6.1% for Italy as a whole. In the South, the average return to schooling
exceeds the return to the average portfolio by nearly seven percentage points. The education
premium is even larger for university attainment. Accounting for taxes on capital income
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4   The long-term budgetary impact of schooling expenditures
Higher schooling raises future tax revenues and reduces social insurance payments. It
is therefore interesting to ask about the long-term budgetary implication of public financing
of schooling. Following de la Fuente, Doménech, and Jimeno (2003) we therefore calculate a
fiscal rate of return to schooling at the macro region level. This rate of return is defined as
the discount rate that equates the present value of public schooling expenditures (including
an opportunity cost component as school attendance reduces current tax payments by
reducing current wage income) with the present value of the increase in tax revenues and the
reduction of social protection payments. It is therefore the maximum real rate of interest at
which the government can borrow to finance educational expenditures without increasing the
present value of future deficits. We also calculate the difference in present value terms
between incremental net fiscal revenues and educational expenditures, which will be referred
to as the net present fiscal value of schooling. Our calculations account for the effects of
education on labor force participation and attempt to approximate the marginal effects of
schooling on wages and employment probabilities (and therefore on tax revenues) in general
equilibrium.
4.1   Methodology
De la Fuente, Doménech, and Jimeno (2003) show that the fiscal rate of return to
schooling is given by
(5)   rf = Rf + g
where g is the exogenous growth rate of productivity and Rf  is implicitly defined by
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where µg is public expenditures per student as a fraction of the gross wage of the
representative worker and q(S) the probability that a worker will be active as a function of
school attainment. In particular, qo = q(So) is the participation rate of adult workers, εq =
q'(So)/q(So) measures the sensitivity of the participation rate to schooling and ηq = qs/qo the
ratio between the participation rates of full-time workers and students of the relevant
attainment level. All other variables are defines as in section 3.
De la Fuente, Doménech, and Jimeno (2003) also show that the net present fiscal value
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where  R' is defined in equation (6) and Wo is the average gross salary of a
representative full-time worker. For a detailed interpretation of (6) and (7) see de la Fuente,
Doménech, and Jimeno (2003).
Our calculations maintain the assumptions of previous sections, with three exceptions.
First, calculations account for the effects of schooling on labor force participation. Second,
calculations will not account for pension benefit issues (and therefore eliminate social
security contributions from the analysis). Finally, to approximate the general equilibrium
effects of increasing educational attainment levels on wages and employment probabilities,
we follow de la Fuente, Doménech, and Jimeno (2003) in multiplying the estimated value of
θ by one minus the share of capital in national income and in introducing ad-hoc adjustment
for the employment and participation parameters. The adjustment consists of a two-thirds
reduction of the original estimates of employment and participation effects.
4.2   Results
The estimates of the fiscal rate of return and the net present fiscal value per student
(which assume a real discount rate of 3%) are shown in Table 16. Both refer to a one-year
increase in average educational attainment in each macro region. The calculations are done
under two different scenarios: Column (1) assumes that private expenditures increase in step34
with public expenditures, while column (2) assumes that all required new expenditures come
from the public sector.
Table 16
FISCAL RATE OF RETURN AND NET PRESENT FISCAL VALUE PER STUDENT
OF AN ADDITIONAL YEAR OF SCHOOLING BY MACRO REGION
                                          fiscal rate of return         net present fiscal value
Financing = priv pub priv pub
(1) (2) (1) (2)
North West 4.3% 3.8% 3251 2191
(0.2%) (0.2%)
North East 3.9% 3.6% 2102 1393
(0.2%) (0.2%)
Center 4.1% 3.8% 2642 1953
(0.4%) (0.4%)
South 4.8% 4.3% 3890 3018
(0.2%) (0.2%)
Objective 1 4.8% 4.4% 3736 3028
(0.2%) (0.2%)
Italy 4.6% 4.2% 3734 2937
(0.2%) (0.2%)
Note: The standard errors in parenthesis have been obtained based on a bootstrap procedure
with 1000 replications.
For Italy as a whole, the fiscal rate of return ranges between 4.2 and 4.6% and the net
fiscal values between 2937 and 3734 euros per student, depending on the scenario.
8
Assuming that all educational expenditures are publicly financed yields regional fiscal rates
of return between 3.6 (in the North East) and 4.3% in the South.
                                                          
8 De la Fuente et al. (2003) find similar results for the case of Spain.35
5  The social rate of return to schooling and the optimal investment pattern
We now calculate the social return to schooling as well as infrastructure and non-
infrastructure capital across macro regions . The main difference with the calculation of the
private return is that the social return considers the effect of schooling on output (not wages)
and ignores taxes and social benefits, as these are resource flows between the public and
private sector.
The model of growth with human capital employed in the calculation is that of
Ciccone (2001), which is a simplified version of the model in de la Fuente and Ciccone
(2002). The simplification consists in elimination of the so-called "rate" effects, which
capture the effect of schooling on technological catch-up, as there is no evidence for such
effects and technological catch-up at the regional level in Italy. As shown in de la Fuente
and Ciccone (2002), the social rate of return is given by
(8)  rs = Rs + g
where  g is the rate of exogenous productivity growth at the frontier and Rs  solves the
following implicit equation














where µ is the total direct cost of a year of schooling measured as a fraction of average
output per worker and ρ  is the aggregate Mincerian returns coefficient. All other parameters
have the same interpretation as in the previous sections.
Our calculation of the social return to schooling assumes that the aggregate capital
intensity does not respond to increased schooling (this is because our estimates of the
aggregate Mincerian returns coefficient is the effect of a one-year increase in schooling on
aggreate output holding the aggregate capital intensity constant, see (2)). Clearly this is an
extreme scenario as increased schooling will raise the return to capital and therefore the
equilibrium capital intensity in the medium and long run. We will account for this effect of
aggregate schooling on the aggregate capital intensity later.36
5.1  Data and sources
Tables 17 and 18 define the variables that enter the social rate of return formula and
summarize the parameter values used in the calculation. As already mentioned, the social
rate of return calculations account for the total effect of schooling on employment. The
values of po,  ε  and  η  used in this section are therefore not conditional on labor force
participation. Also, µ now refers to total expenditure relative to average labor productivity
(rather than private relative to average full-time earnings).
Table 17
VARIABLES USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE SOCIAL
RATE OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING AND SOURCES OF THE DATA
ρ, ρmin = macroeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. It measures the average
(log) increase in output per employed worker resulting from an additional year of schooling
of the adult population. It is obtained by dividing the estimated elasticity of output with
respect to the stock of human capital (￿) by average attainment in each region. Source:
Section 2.3.
U  =  59.4 = Average retirement age in 1995 in Italy, constructed by averaging separate
estimates for men and women, weighted in proportion to their shares in total employment.
Source: de la Fuente (2003).
So = average years of school attainment of the adult population (between 25 and 65 years
old) in 2000. Source: LFS (2000)
H = U - Max(6+So, 15) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of the
representative individual.
µ = total (private + public) cost of schooling per student measured relative to output per
worker (weighted average of secondary and tertiary levels with weights 2/3 and 1/3
respectively). Source: Appendix A1 and Italian Institute of Statistics (www.istat.it).
po = total probability of employment after leaving school, taking into account the
probabilities of employment and labor force participation. Estimated using the results in
section 2.2.
η  = correction factor capturing lower student labor force participation and employment
rates. Estimated using the results in section 2.2.
ε = p'(S)/p(S) = general equilibrium sensitivity of the total probability of employment to the
level of schooling. Estimated using the results in section 2.2.37
Table 18
DATA USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE SOCIAL RATE OF RETURN TO
SCHOOLING
So ρ ρmin µ po η  ε
North West 9.44 5.3% 4.4% 10.7% 73.1% 0.56% 0.55%
North East 9.31 5.4% 4.4% 10.9% 75.8% 1.09% 0.40%
Center 9.70 5.2% 4.2% 10.8% 69.5% 1.45% 0.96%
South 8.95 5.6% 4.6% 11.3% 54.9% 1.94% 2.49%
Objective 1 8.91 5.6% 4.6% 11.2% 53.7% 1.84% 2.58%
Italy 9.30 5.4% 4.4% 10.6% 66.3% 1.53% 1.34%
5.2   Results
Table 19 shows two alternative estimates of the social rate of return to schooling (rs)
across regions. The only difference between the two figures has to do with the assumed
value of the level effects parameter (β), which is 0.501 in the first case (baseline) and 0.411
in the other (min). According to the baseline estimates, the social rate of return to schooling
ranges from 5.9% in the North to nearly 8% in the South. Under the more pessimistic
assumption regarding β, the social return drops by 1% in all regions.
It is important to recall at this point that calculation of the social return to schooling in
Table 19 assumes a constant aggregate capital intensity (a rather extreme scenario), which
implies that these social returns should not be compared directly to private returns to
schooling. To compare social and private returns to schooling, it is necessary to make
assumptions about how the aggregate capital intensity responds to the increase in aggregate
schooling. One such assumption would be to postulate perfect international capital markets38
(another extreme scenario). In this case the calculation of the social return to schooling
would have to include the effect of the induced increase in the aggregate capital intensity on
output. This calculation (assuming the same parameter values as above and a physical capital
income share of 30 percent) yields a social return to schooling in Italy of 9.5%.
9 Averaging
the social returns of the two extreme scenarios (9.5% and 6.8%, see Table 19) yields a social
return to schooling of around 8.2%. Hence, the social return to schooling in Italy does not
seem to be higher than the private return to schooling. This could change of course if we
were to include additional aspects of the return to schooling, like the effects of schooling on
health or social capital, in the calculation (these returns are hard to quantify however, see de
la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002).
Table 19
 SOCIAL RATE OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING IN ITALY
(HOLDING THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL INTENSITY CONSTANT)
Baseline Min
North West 5.9% 4.8%
(1.8%) (2.5%)










Note: The standard errors in parenthesis have been obtained based on a bootstrap procedure
with 1000 replications.
                                                          
9  This value is obtained by repeating the calculation of the social returns to schooling using a
macroeconomic Mincerian returns to schooling parameter ρ∗ =ρ/(1−α) where α is the capital income share.39
5.3   The relative returns to investment in schooling and in physical capital
This section compares the social return to schooling (using the baseline and min
estimates) with the returns to non-infrastructure physical capital and to infrastructures (rk
and rx). The two rates of return are calculated as ri = MPi - δi + g, where MPi is the
marginal product of factor i, δi its rate of depreciation and g the rate of technical progress
(which is assumed to be 1.5% as in the previous sections). The marginal products are
calculated using the estimates of the production function in equation (2).
The main difficulty when assessing the marginal products to non-infrastructure
physical capital and to infrastructures is that estimating (2) using the CRENOS infrastructure
series yields different results than using the Bonaglia and Picci (2000) infrastructure series.
In particular, the Bonaglia and Picci (2000) infrastructure series yields statistically
significant effects of infrastructures on productivity but insignificant effects of non-
infrastructure capital, while the CRENOS series produces the opposite results. To identify
upper bounds on the social return to non-infrastructure capita and infrastructure, we will rely
on the Bonaglia and Picci (2000) infrastructure series for the social return to infrastructure
and on the CRENOS series for the social return to non-infrastructure capital.
With the Bonaglia and Picci (2000) infrastructure series and the CRENOS non-
infrastructure physical capital series we find that average returns to infrastructures are larger
in the North than in the South. We also find that in the South the social return to schooling
exceeds that to infrastructure by more than 5% even under the most conservative (min)
scenario. In the North and the Center the social return to infrastructures exceeds that to
schooling.
Using the CRENOS infrastructure and non-infrastructure physical capital series yields
an average return to non-infrastructures physical capital in Italy of 4.7%. Hence, the social
return to schooling exceeds the social return to non-infrastructures physical capital even
under the most conservative (min) scenario. We also find that the social return to schooling
exceeds that to non-infrastructure physical capital by more than 4% in the South.40
6. Summary
We have estimated the private (individual) and social return to schooling in Italy as a
whole and four macro regions. While our contribution is centered on this (rather complex)
task of measurement and estimation, there are some conclusions that seem worthwhile
emphasizing (and exploring further) at this point:
1. The private (individual) return to schooling in Italy increases by around 50% when the
calculation accounts for schooling reducing unemployment spells (which given Italy’s
low replacement rates lead to substantial income losses) in addition to increasing wages.
This continues to be the case when we control for the endogeneity of individual
schooling.
2.  There is no evidence that the private return to schooling is lower in the South than in the
North of Italy.
3.  Estimates of the private return to schooling compare favorably to the return to financial
assets (especially in poorer regions) suggesting that financial incentives to invest in
schooling are adequate.
4.  While the (mostly) public provision of schooling in Italy raises the private return to
schooling, this effect is more than offset by the progressivity of the income tax. Our
calculations suggest that the private return to schooling in Italy would rise if tuition
reflected the social cost of schooling and taxes were proportional to income.




A1. Expenditures on secondary and university education in 2000
Private and public expenditures per student in formal education at the upper secondary
and university level can be estimated using data from different publications of the Ministry
of Education, University and Research (MIUR) and the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT)
(details on the data sources and the calculations can be found in Table A2). Secondary
schooling includes general academic programs as well as programs that combine general
academic and a more vocational education. Public expenditures are the sum of operating
costs of public educational institutions (net of research expenditures by universities), indirect
costs (general administration and support programs) and two types of subsidies to
households: tuition waivers at the university level and subsidies to cover living expenses and
other costs at the university level. Private expenditures are defined as tuition fees paid by
households plus expenditures on books and school materials minus non-tuition subsidies
received by them. Total expenditures are calculated as the sum of public and private
expenditures.
Table A1 shows expenditures per student at the upper secondary and university level for
the year 2000, combining students enrolled in private and public centers. These figures are
relative to average expenditures per student in the entire country. Following de la Fuente,
Doménech, and Jimeno (2003), the last three columns (under the heading Combined)
approximate the cost per student of an increase in upper secondary attainment under the
assumption that half of those graduating from upper secondary school will go on to
university (they are weighted averages of expenditures per student at the upper secondary
and university level with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively). The last row of the table
contains average expenditures for the whole of Italy in Euros.
                                                          
10 For the administrative-region-level data see Ciccone (2004).42
Table A1
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES PER STUDENT, 2000
(WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF ALL REGIONS, ITALY= 100)
Upper secondary University Combined
private Public total Private public total private public total
North West 111 103 104 166 112 122 141 106 110
North East 89 108 107 104 104 104 97 107 106
Center 86 103 102 91 106 103 89 104 102
South 118 94 96 83 88 87 99 92 93
Objective 1 99 95 95 63 90 85 79 93 92
Average,
Euros 388 4999 5387 929 4408 5338 568 4802 537043
Table A2
SOURCES USED TO ESTIMATE EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES PER
STUDENT BY REGION
Total public expenditures on secondary school for the year 1999 are taken from Ministry of
Education, University and Research (MIUR) 2001, Indicatori della spesa pubblica per
l’istruzione scolastica. Anno finanziario 1999 (www.miur.it). The estimate for the year
2000 is obtained by applying the increase in aggregate education expenditures between
1999 and 2000 in MIUR 2002, Spesa pubblica per l’istruzione, anni 1991-2000 to the
1999 figure. Regional expenditures are estimated based on the number of teachers at the
regional level available in MIUR 2003, Alunni, classi, docenti. Dalla scuola materna
alle scuole superiori in Italia, 1996-2003.
Sub-regional expenditures on secondary school for the year 2000 are taken from MIUR
2002, La spesa per l’istruzione delle province e dei comuni, anno finanziario 2000.
The number of enrolled secondary school students is taken from MIUR 2003, Department of
Statistics, Alunni iscritti alle scuole secondarie superiori per regione, anni 1999-2000 e
2000-2001.
Total public expenditures on universities are calculations made by the National Committee
for the Evaluation of the University System (www.cnvsu.it) based on data from MIUR
2003, Department of Statistics, Indagine sull'istruzione universitaria anno 2000 e 2001.
R&D expenditures are taken from Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 2003, Lo stato
dell’Università. I principali indicatori. Anno accademico 1999-2000 (www.istat.it).
Private secondary school expenditures (private secondary school, books etc.) are estimates
based on ISTAT 2003, Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie, Anno 2000.
Private university expenditures (university fees paid at private and public universities, etc.)
are taken from three different sources. Fees paid to public universities are taken from
MIUR 2003, Department of Statistics, Indagine sull'istruzione universitaria anno 2000
e 2001. Fees paid to private universities are taken from MIUR 2003, Department of
Statistics, La contribuzione studentesca e delle altre entrate da parte degli studenti.
Rilevazione 2000. Other expenditures (books etc.) are estimated based on ISTAT 2003,
Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie, Anno 2000.
Enrolled university students are taken from MIUR 2003, Department of Statistics, Studenti
iscritti per Ateneo. Valori assoluti, anni 1999-2000 e 2000-2001.
Living subsidies for university students are taken from ISTAT 2003, Lo stato
dell’Università. I principali indicatori. Anno accademico 1999-2000.44
Public upper secondary school expenditures
The starting point is total public spending on upper secondary education in Italy in
2000 less public spending on upper secondary education by sub-regional administrations
(comuni and provincie). These expenditures are distributed across regions in proportion to
the number of secondary school teachers in each region. These regional expenditures plus
upper secondary education expenditures by sub-regional administrations are equal to public
secondary school expenditures at the regional level. Note that this procedure treats total
public spending by regional governments like public spending by the national government.
While it would have been preferable to differentiate between the two types of expenditures,
this is not feasible as reliable information of public upper secondary school expenditures by
regional governments seems to be unavailable. The resulting inaccuracy is likely to be very
small however as public spending by regional governments amounted to only 2.3% of total
public spending in 1999, the latest year for which information is available (MIUR 2001,
Indicatori della spesa pubblica per l’istruzione scolastica. Anno finanziario 1999).
Private upper secondary school expenditures
Private expenditures on upper secondary school consist of expenditures on books and
other school materials and tuition fees of students at private upper secondary schools. These
are estimates using ISTAT 2003, Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie, Anno 2000.
Public expenditures on university education
The starting point is expenditures at the university level obtained from balance sheet
data for the year 2000. These figures are aggregated to the regional level. Subtracting
university R&D expenditures at the regional level and adding scholarships and non-tuition
subsidies from public sources other than universities (housing and food subsidies) yields
public expenditures on university education.
Private expenditures on university education
Private expenditures on university education consist of expenditures on books and
other university materials and tuition fees of students at private and public universities. The
starting point is income from tuition fees obtained at the university level from balance sheet
data of all public universities in 2000. To these we add an estimate of fees paid to private45
Universities (in this case the latest available year for which information is available is 1999).
These figures are aggregate to the regional level and combined with estimates of
expenditures of books and other university material obtained using ISTAT 2003, Indagine
sui consumi delle famiglie, Anno 2000. The final figure is obtained by subtraction non-
tuition subsidies from public sources other than universities (housing and food subsidies)
A2. Data used to calculate the private return to upper secondary school
attainment and university attainment
Table A3
TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY DATA USED TO CALCULATE THE PRIVATE
RETURN TO UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY ATTAINMENT
Upper Secondary University
T' τ0 T' τ0
North West 33.40% 29.03% 42.69% 30.85%
North East 33.50% 31.18% 42.69% 32.35%
Center 33.50% 30.80% 42.69% 32.27%
South 33.50% 30.54% 42.69% 31.79%
Objective 1 33.50% 30.33% 42.69% 31.62%
Italy 33.5% 29.22% 42.69% 30.75%46
Table A4
DATA USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE PRIVATE RATE OF RETURN TO
UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTAINMENT
µs µ po ps ηε
North West 2.2% 28.8% 94.6% 68.7% 72.58% 1.03%
North East 1.6% 26.5% 96.0% 84.4% 87.90% 0.57%
Center 1.5% 25.2% 92.1% 58.5% 63.58% 1.32%
South 2.3% 26.5% 77.9% 32.8% 42.08% 3.44%
Objective 1 2.0% 26.1% 76.6% 30.3% 39.62% 3.53%
Italy 1.9% 26.0% 89.50% 58.47% 65.33% 2.09%
Table A5
DATA USED IN THE CALCULATION OF THE PRIVATE RATE OF RETURN TO
UNIVERSITY ATTAINMENT
µs µ po ps ηε
North West 6.6% 27.5% 97.6% 76.0% 77.83% 0.52%
North East 3.9% 22.4% 97.7% 84.3% 86.22% -0.01%
Center 3.3% 21.2% 95.6% 67.4% 70.53% 0.93%
South 3.3% 19.8% 88.1% 54.4% 61.77% 3.64%
Objective 1 2.5% 19.4% 87.1% 53.0% 60.78% 3.92%
Italy 3.8% 21.7% 95.00% 70.46% 74.17% 1.48%47
A3.  Average full-time earnings by regions and educational attainment
Calculations of average full-time earnings by regions and educational attainment are
based on SHIW net earnings data. Gross earnings are obtained using the lower bounds of the
Brandolini and Cipollone (2003) adjustment factors.
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Table A6
AVERAGE FULL-TIME EARNINGS BY REGIONS AND EDUCATIONAL




North West 24111 23548 26766
North East 24331 24760 28392
Center 24563 26030 31004
South 23260 23377 26987
Objective 1 23365 23400 27024
Italy 24224 24622 28229
                                                          
11 See Section 2.1 for details.48
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